Abstract-The Flume system is an implementation of decentralized information flow control (DIFC) at the operating system level. Prior work has shown Flume can be implemented as a practical extension to the Linux operating system, allowing real Web applications to achieve useful security guarantees. However, the question remains if the Flume system is actually secure. This paper compares Flume with other recent DIFC systems like Asbestos, arguing that the latter is inherently susceptible to certain wide-bandwidth covert channels, and proving their absence in Flume by means of a noninterference proof in the Communicating Sequential Processes formalism.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent work in operating systems [1] , [2] , [3] makes the case that Distributed Information Flow Control (DIFC) [4] solves important application-level security problems for real systems. For example, modern dynamic web sites are trusted to safeguard private data for millions of users, but they often fail in their task (e.g., [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] ). Web applications built atop DIFC operating systems can achieve better security properties, by factoring security-critical code into small, isolated, trustworthy processes, while allowing the rest of the application to balloon without affecting the TCB.
To achieve such a split between trustworthy and untrustworthy components, DIFC must monitor and regulate the information flows among them. Enforcement today exists in two forms: static, as an extension of a programming language's type system; and dynamic, as a feature of an OS's system call interface. These two styles have their strengths and weaknesses: DIFC for programming languages gives fine-grained guarantees about which parts of the program have been influenced by which types of data, but it requires rewrites of existing applications using one of a few compiled languages. DIFC at the OS level gives coarser-grained information flow tracking (each process is its own security domain) but supports existing applications and languages. In particular, popular Web applications written in popular interpreted languages (e.g. Python, PHP, Perl and Ruby) can achieve improved security on DIFC OSes. A case can be made for both techniques, but to date, only DIFC at the language level has enjoyed formal security guarantees. This paper considers the Flume system: a DIFC OS implemented as a 30,000-line extension to a standard Linux kernel [3] . Flume allows legacy processes to run as before, while confining those that need strong security guarantees (like web servers and network applications) to a tightly-controlled sandbox, from which all of their communication must conform to DIFC-based rules. This technique produces real security improvements in real web applications, like the popular Python-based MoinMoin Wiki package. But all claims of application-level security presuppose a correct OS kernel, appealing to intuition alone to justify the OS's security. Intuition can mislead: other seemingly-secure OSes ( [1] , [11] ) have inadvertently included high-bandwidth covert channels in their very interface, allowing information to leak against intended security policies (see Section III for more details). This paper presents the first formal noninterference security argument for a real DIFC operating system -in this case, Flume. A DIFC OS with provable security guarantees is an important foundation for provable application-level security, both in web services (Flume's first application) and in other security-sensitive applications.
The roadmap is follows. Section II reviews the Flume system and its intended policies at a high level: first and foremost, that untrustworthy applications can compute with private data without being able to reveal (i.e. leak) it. Section III describes potential pitfalls, motivating a formal approach. Section IV describes the important parts of the Flume System using a formal process algebra, namely Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP). This model captures a trustworthy kernel, untrustworthy user-space applications, and userspace applications with privilege, which can selectively reveal or declassify sensitive data. Next, Section V proves that this model fulfills noninterference: that unprivileged user processes cannot leak data from the system, whether via explicit communication or implicit channels. Flume meets a CSP definition of noninterference that we have minimally extended to accommodate user-space declassifiers. Though the arguments focus on secrecy, the same model and proof also applies to integrity.
In sum, this paper contributes the following new results: 1) A formal model for a real DIFC Linux-based operating system, which captures a trustworthy kernel, and both privileged and unprivileged user-space applications; and 2) A formal proof of noninterference. There are important limitations. First, the actual Flume implementation is not guaranteed to follow the model described in the processalgebra. Second, there are no guarantees that covert channels do not exist in parts of the system that the model abstracts. In particular, the Flume model does not capture physical hardware, so covert channels might of course exist in Flume's use of the processor, the disk, memory, etc. What our result does imply is that those operating systems the follow the given interface (like Flume) have a chance of achieving good security properties; i.e., wide leaks are not "baked" into their specifications. We leave a machine-checkable proof and a verified implementation of the model to future work.
II. REVIEW OF FLUME
This section reviews Flume's security primitives, previously reported elsewhere [3] . Flume uses tags and labels to track data as it flows through a system. Let T be a very large set of opaque tokens called tags. A tag carries no inherent meaning, but processes generally associate each tag with some category of secrecy or integrity. For example, a tag b ∈ T may label Bob's private data.
Labels are subsets of T . Labels form a lattice under the partial order of the subset relation [12] . Each Flume process p has two labels, Sp for secrecy and Ip for integrity. Both labels serve to (1) summarize which types of data have influenced p in the past and (2) regulate where p can read and write in the future. Consider a process p and a tag t. If t ∈ Sp, then the system conservatively assumes that p has seen some private data tagged with t. In the future, p can read more private data tagged with t but requires consent from an authority who controls t before it can reveal any data publicly. If there are multiple tags in Sp, then p requires independent consent for each tag before writing publicly. Process p's integrity label Ip serves as a lower bound on the purity of its influences: if t ∈ Ip, then every input to p has been endorsed as having integrity for t. To maintain this property, the system only allows p to read from other sources that also have t in their integrity labels. Files (and other objects) also have secrecy and integrity labels; they can be thought of as passive processes.
Distributed Information Flow Control (DIFC) is a generalization of centralized IFC. In centralized IFC, only a trusted "security officer" can create new tags, subtract tags from secrecy labels (declassify information), or add tags to integrity labels (endorse information). In Flume DIFC, any process can create new tags, which gives that process the privilege to declassify and/or endorse information for those tags.
A. Capabilities
Flume represents privilege using two capabilities per tag. Capabilities are objects from the set O = T × {−, +}. For tag t, the capabilities are denoted t + and t − . Each process p owns a set of capabilities Op ⊆ O. A process with t + ∈ Op owns the t + capability, giving it the privilege to add t to its labels; and a process with t − ∈ Op can remove t from its labels. In terms of secrecy, t + lets a process add t to its secrecy label, granting itself the privilege to receive secret t data, while t − lets it remove t from its secrecy label, effectively declassifying any secret t data it has seen. In terms of integrity, t − lets a process remove t from its integrity label, allowing it to receive low-t-integrity data, while t + lets it add t to its integrity label, endorsing the process's current state as high-t-integrity. A process that owns both t + and t − has dual privilege for t and can completely control how t appears in its labels. The set Dp where
represents all tags for which p has dual privilege. Any process p can invent or "allocate" a new tag. Tag allocation yields a fresh tag t ∈ T and sets Op ← Op ∪ {t + , t − }, granting p dual privilege for t. Tag allocation should not expose any information about system state.
For a set of capabilities O ⊆ O, we define the notation:
B. Global Capabilities
Flume also supports a global capability setÔ, Every process has access to every capability inÔ, useful for implementing key security policies (see Section II-D). A process p's effective set of capabilities is given by:Ō p Op ∪Ô Similarly, its effective set of dual privileges is given by:
Tag allocation can updateÔ; an allocation parameter determines whether the new tag's t + , t − , or neither is added toÔ (and thus to every current and future process'sŌp). Flume restricts access to the shared setÔ, lest processes manipulate it to leak data. A first restriction is that processes can only add a tag toÔ during the tag's allocation (otherwise a process p could leak information to a process q by either adding or refraining from adding a pre-specified tag toÔ). A second restriction is that no process p can enumerateÔ orŌp (otherwise, p could poll Ô while q allocated new tags, allowing q to communicate bits to p). Processes can, however, enumerate their non-global capabilities (those in Op), since they do not share this resource with other processes.
A process p can grant capabilities in Op to process q so long as p can send a message to q. p can also subtract capabilities from Op as it sees fit.
C. Security
The Flume model assumes many processes running on the same machine and communicating via messages, or "flows". The model's goal is to track data flow by regulating both process communication and process label changes.
1) Safe Label Changes:
In the Flume model (as in HiStar), the labels Sp and Ip of a process p can be changed only by an explicit request from p itself. Other models allow a process's label to change as the result of receiving a message [1] , [13] , [11] , but implicit label changes turn the labels themselves into covert channels [12] , [2] (see Section III). Only those label changes permitted by a process's capabilities are safe: Definition 1 (Safe label change). For a process p, let the label L be Sp or Ip, and let L be the requested new value of the label. The change from L to L is safe if and only if:
For example, say process p wishes to subtract tag t from Sp, to achieve a new secrecy label S p . In set notation, t ∈ Sp − S p , and such a transition is safe only if p owns the subtraction capability for t (i.e. t − ∈Ōp). Likewise, t can be added only if t + ∈Ōp.
2) Safe Messages: Information flow control restricts process communication to prevent data leaks. The Flume model restricts communication among unprivileged processes as in traditional IFC: p can send a message to q only if Sp ⊆ Sq ("no read up, no write down" [14] ) and Iq ⊆ Ip ("no read down, no write up" [15] ).
Flume relaxes these rules to better accommodate declassifiers. Specifically, if two processes could communicate by changing their labels, sending a message using the centralized IFC rules, and then restoring their original labels, then the model can safely allow the processes to communicate without actually performing label changes. A process can make such a temporary label change only for tags in Dp, i.e., those for which it has dual privilege. A process p with labels Sp, Ip would get maximum latitude in sending messages if it were to lower its secrecy to Sp −Dp and raise its integrity to Ip ∪Dp. It could receive the most messages if it were to raise secrecy to Sp ∪Dp and lower integrity to Ip −Dp.
The following definition captures these hypothetical label changes to determine what messages are safe: Definition 2 (Safe message). A message from p to q is safe iff Sp −Dp ⊆ Sq ∪Dq and Iq −Dq ⊆ Ip ∪Dp .
3) External Sinks and Sources:
Any data sink or source outside of Flume's control, such as a remote host, the user's terminal, a printer, and so forth, is modeled as an unprivileged process x with permanently empty secrecy and integrity labels: Sx = Ix = {} and also Ox = {}. As a result, a process p can only write to the network or console if it could reduce its secrecy label to {} (the only label with Sp ⊆ Sx), and a process can only read from the network or keyboard if it could reduce its integrity label to {} (the only label with Ip ⊆ Ix).
D. Security Policies
The most important security policy in Flume is export protection, wherein untrustworthy processes can compute with secret data without the ability to reveal it. An export protection tag is a tag t such that t + ∈Ô and t − / ∈Ô. For a process p to achieve such a result, it creates a new tag t and grants t + to the global setÔ, while closely guarding t − . To protect a file f , p creates the file with secrecy label {t}. If a process q wishes to read f , it must first add t to Sq, which it can do since t + ∈Ô ⊆Ōq. Now, q can only send messages to other processes with t in their labels. It requires p's authorization to remove t from its label or send data to the network. Additional Flume policies exist, like those that protect integrity.
III. COVERT CHANNELS IN DYNAMIC LABEL SYSTEMS
As described in Section II-C, processes in Flume change their labels explicitly; labels do not change implicitly upon message receipt, as they do in Asbestos [1] or IX [11] . We show by example why implicit label changes (also known as "floating" labels) enable high-throughput information leaks (as predicted by Denning [12] ).
Consider a process p with secrecy label Sp = {t} and a process q with Sq = {}, both with empty ownership sets Op = Oq = {}. In a floating label system like Asbestos, p can send a message to q, and q will successfully receive it, upon which the kernel automatically raises Sq = {t}. Thus, the kernel can track which processes have seen secrets tagged with t, even if those processes are uncooperative. Such a scheme introduces new problems: what if a process q doesn't want its label to change from Sq = {}? For this reason, Asbestos also introduces "receive labels," which let processes filter out traffic and avoid unwanted label changes.
The problem with floating is best seen through example (see Figures 1-3 ). Imagine processes p and q as above, with a sender process p wanting to leak the 2-bit secret "01" to a receiver process q. Their goal is to transmit these bits without q's label changing. Figure 1 shows the initialization: q launches two helper processes (q1 and q2), each with a label initialized to Sq i = {}. q's version of the secret starts out initialized to all 0s, but it will overwrite some of those bits during the attack.
Next, p communicates selected bits of the secret to its helpers. If the ith bit of the message is equal to 0, then p sends the message "0" to the process qi. If the ith bit of the message is 1, p does nothing. Figure 2 shows this step. When receiving this 0 bit, q1's label changed, floating up from {} to {t}, as the kernel accounts for how information flowed.
In the last step (Figure 3 ), the qi processes wait for a predefined time limit before giving up. At the timeout, each qi which did not receive a message (here, q2) sends a message "1" to q, and upon receipt of this message q updates the bit at position i to 1. The remaining processes (q1) do not write to q, nor could they without affecting q's label. Now, q has the exact secret, copied bit-for-bit from p. This example shows 2 bits of data leak, but by forking n processes, p and q can leak n bits per timeout period. Because Asbestos's event process abstraction makes forking very fast, this channel on Asbestos can leak kilobits of data per second.
This attack fails against the Flume system. In Figure 2 , each qi must each make a decision: should it raise its secrecy label to Sq i = {t}, or leave it as is? If qi raises Sq i then it will receive messages from p, but it won't be able to write to q. Otherwise, qi will never receive a message from p. In either case, qi cannot alter its messages to q in response to messages from p. And crucially, qi must decide whether to upgrade Sq i before receiving messages from p.
IV. THE FORMAL FLUME MODEL
That the above attack fails against the Flume model is useful intuition but proves nothing. This section and the next seek a formal separation between the Asbestos style of "floating" labels and the Flume style of "explicitly specified" labels. The ultimate goal is to prove that Flume exhibits noninterference: for example, that processes with empty ownership and whose secrecy label contains t cannot in any way alter the execution of those processes with empty labels. Such a noninterference result requires a formal model of Flume, which we build up here. Section V provides the proof that the Flume Model meets a standard definition of noninterference with high probability.
We present a formal model for the Flume System in the Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) process algebra [16] (reviewed in Appendix A). The model captures a kernel and arbitrary user processes that can interact through a system call interface. Processes can communicate with one another over IPC, changing labels, allocating tags, and forking new processes. The model dictates which kernel details are safe to expose to user-level applications, where I/O can safely happen, which return codes from system calls to provide, etc. It does not capture lower-level hardware details, like CPU, cache, memory, network or disk usage. Therefore, it is powerless to disprove the existence of covert channels that modulate CPU, cache, memory, network or disk usage to communicate data from one process to another. Figure 4 depicts the Flume model organization. At a high level, the model splits each Unix-like process i running on a system (e.g., a web server or text editor) into two logical components: a user half Ui that can take almost any form, and a kernel half i:K that behaves according to a strict state machine. 1 The user half of a process can communicate with its kernel half (and thus, indirectly, with other user processes) through the system call interface, which takes the form of a CSP channel i.s between the Ui and i:K. The kernel halves communicate with one another to deliver IPCs initiated by user processes. Also inside the kernel, a global process (TAGMGR) manages the circulation of tags and globally-shared privileges; another global process (PROCMGR) manages the process ID space. The process SWITCH is involved with communication between user-level processes. The remainder of this section fills out the details of the Flume model.
A. System Call Interface
The "system-call" interface consists of events on the channel i.s between Ui and i:K. Each user-level process has access to the following system calls:
Allocate a new tag t, and depending on the parameter which, make the associated capabilities for t globally accessible. Here, which can be one of None, Remove or Add. For Remove, add t − toÔ, effectively granting it to all other processes; likewise, for Add, add t + toÔ.
• rc ← change label(which, L) Change the process's which label to L. Return Ok on success and Error on failure. Here, which can be either Secrecy or Integrity.
Read this process's own label out of the kernel's data structures. Here, which can be either Secrecy or Integrity, controlling which label is read.
Read this process's ownership set out of the kernel's data structures.
Send message msg and capabilities X to process j. (Crucially, the sender gets no indication whether the transmission failed due to label checks.)
Receive message msg and capabilities X from process j. Block until a message is ready.
• j ← fork() Fork the current process; yield a process j. fork returns j in the parent process and 0 in the child process.
Return i, the ID of the current process.
See Appendix E for a description of the select system call that allows receiving processes to listen on multiple channels at once.
The Flume model places no restrictions on the Uis other than on their communication. A process Ui can communicate with i:K via channel i.s; it can communicate with itself via channels that it invents; otherwise, it has no other communication channels.
B. Kernel Processes
Each process i has an instantiation of the kernel process K that obeys a strict state machine. We apply CSP's standard technique for "relabeling" the interior states of a process, giving i:K. By definition, i:K and j:K have different alphabets for i = j, so their operations cannot interfere. Each process i:K takes on a state configuration based on process i's labels. That is, i:KS,I,O denotes the kernel half of process i, with secrecy label Si ⊆ T , integrity label Ii ⊆ T , and ownership of capabilities given by Oi ⊆ O.
At a high level, a kernel process K starts idle, then springs to life upon receiving an activation message. Once active, it receives either system calls from its user half, or internal messages from other kernel processes on the system. It eventually dies when the user process exits. In CSP notation:
where b is the channel that K listens on for its "birth" message. It expects arguments of the form (S, I, O), to instruct it which labels and capabilities to start its execution with. Subsequently, KS,I,O handles the bulk of the kernel process's duties:
KS,I,O = SYSCALLS,I,O | INTRECVS,I,O
where SYSCALL is a subprocess tasked with handling all system calls, and INTRECV is the internal receiving sub-process, tasked with receiving internal messages from other kernel processes.
Each system call gets its own dedicated subprocess:
SYSCALLS,I,O = NEWTAGS,I,O |

CHANGELABELS,I,O |
READMYLABELS,I,O |
READMYCAPSS,I,O |
DROPCAPSS,I,O |
SENDS,I,O |
RECVS,I,O |
FORKS,I,O |
GETPIDS,I,O |
EXITS,I,O
Section IV-D presents all of these subprocesses in more detail.
C. Process Alphabets
In the next section, we will prove properties about the system, in particular, that messages between "high processes" (those that have a specified tag in their secrecy label) do not influence the activity of "low processes." The standard CSP approach to such proofs is to split the system's alphabet into two disjoint sets: "high" symbols, those that the secret influences; and "low" symbols, those that should not be affected by the secret. We must provide the appropriate alphabets for these processes so that any symbol in the model unambiguously belongs to one set or the other.
For example, take process i with secrecy label Si = {t} and integrity label Ii = {}. When Ui issues a system call (say create tag(Add)) to its kernel half i:K, the trace for Ui is of the form . . . , i.s!(create tag, Add), . . . That is, Ui is sending a message (create tag, Add) on the channel i.s, and i:K is receiving it. The problem, however, is that looking at these traces does not capture the fact that i's secrecy label contains t and therefore that Ui is in a "high" state in which it should not affect low processes. Such a shortcoming does not inhibit the accuracy of the model, but it does inhibit the proof of noninterference in Section V. A solution to the problem is to include a process's labels in the messages it sends. That is, once i has a secrecy label of S = {t}, its kernel process should be in a state such as K {t},{},{} . When a kernel process is in this state, it will only receive system calls of the form i.s?({t}, {}, {}, create tag, Add). Thus, Ui must now send system calls in the form:
i.s!({t}, {}, {}, create tag, Add)
In this regime, Ui must do its own accounting of Si and Ii. If it fails to do so and sent a system call of the form 
For example, kernel process i:
expanded as s?({t}, {u}, {t − }, fork).
D. System Calls
We now define the sub-processes of KS,I,O that correspond to the kernel's implementation of each system call. The first system call subprocess handles a user process's request for new tags. Much of this system call is handled by a subroutine call to the global tag manager TAGMGR. After tag allocation, the kernel process transitions to a different state, reflecting the new privilege(s) it acquired for tag t. 2 
NEWTAGS,I,O
The CHANGELABEL subprocess is split into two cases, one for secrecy and one for integrity (the latter elided for brevity):
CHANGELABELS,I,O = S-CHANGES,I,O | I-CHANGES,I,O S-CHANGES,I,O
In both cases, the user process specifies a new label, and the CHECK subroutine determines if that label change is valid. In the success case, the kernel process transitions to a new state, reflecting the new labels.
In the failure case, the kernel process remains in the same state. The CHECK process computes the validity of the label change based on the process's current capabilities, as well as the global capabilitiesÔ (captured by a global process listening on the g channel):
As we will see below, the global tag register replies True to
+ . Thus, we have that the user process can only change from label L to L if it can subtract all tags in L − L and add all tags in L − L, either by its own capabilities or those globally owned (see Definition 1 in Section II-C).
The user half of a process can call the kernel half to determine its own S or I labels and its capabilities O:
A process also can discard capabilities using DROPCAPS:
On a successful drop of capabilities, the process transitions to a new kernel state, reflecting the reduced ownership set. The next process to cover is forking. Recall that each active task i on the system has two components: a user component Ui and a kernel component i:K. The Flume model does not capture what happens to Ui when it calls fork, 3 but the kernel-side behavior of fork is specified as follows:
Recall that i.p is a channel from the i-th kernel process to the process manager in the kernel, PROCMGR. (The latter allocates the child's process ID j and gives birth to j:K.)
The process handling getpid is straightforward:
And user processes issue an exit system call as they terminate:
Once a process with a given ID has run and exited, its ID is retired, never to be used again.
E. Communication
The communication subprocesses are the crux of the Flume CSP model. They require care to ensure that subtle state transitions in high processes do not result in observable behavior by low processes. At the same time, they must make a concerted effort to deliver messages, so that the system is useful.
The beginning of a message delivery sequence is the process i:SENDS,I,O, invoked when Ui wishes to send a message to Uj. Messages are of the form (X, m), where X is a set of capabilities, and m is an arbitrary string. To send, the kernel shrinks the process's S label and grows its integrity label I as much as allowed by its privileges. The kernel also winnows the transmitted capabilities to those that Ui actually owns (X ∩ O). The message (X, m) passes through the switchboard process SWITCH via channel i.c, which forwards it j.
The process SWITCH listens on the other side of the receive channel i.c. It accepts messages of the form i.c?(S, I, j, X, m) and forwards them to the process j:K as j.c!(S, I, i, X, m):
The SWITCH process sends messages in parallel with the next receive operation. This parallelism avoids deadlocking the system if the receiving process has exited, not yet started, or is waiting to send a message. In other words, the SWITCH process is always willing to receive a new message, delegating potentially-blocking send operations to an asynchronous child process.
Once the message leaves the switch, the receiver process handles it with its INTRECV subprocess. After performing the label checks given by Definition 2 in Section II-C2, this process enqueues the incoming message for later retrieval:
The final link in the chain is the actual message delivery in user space. For a user process to receive a message, it calls into the kernel, asking it to dequeue and deliver any waiting messages. Receiving also updates the process's ownership, to reflect new capabilities it gained.
RECVS,I,O
= s ? κ (recv, j) → q!(dequeue, j) → q?(X, m) → s ! κ m → KS,I,O∪X
F. Helper Processes
It now remains to fill in the details for the helper processes that the various KS,I,O processes call upon. They are: TAGMGR, which manages all global tag allocation and global capabilities; QUEUES, which manages receive message queues, one per process; and finally PROCMGR, which manages process creation, deletion, etc.
1) The Tag Manager (TAGMGR):
The tag manager keeps track of a global universe of tags (T ), and the global set of privileges available to all processes (Ô). It also tabulates which tags have already been allocated, so as never to reissue the same tag. The setT refers to those tags that were allocated in the past. Thus, the task manager's state is parameterized as TAGMGRÔ ,T . Initially,Ô andT are empty:
Once active, the tag manager services several calls:
Many of these subprocesses will call upon a subroutine that randomly chooses an element from a given set. We define that subroutine here. Given a set Y :
That is, the subprocess CHOOSE nondeterministically picks an element y from Y and returns it to the caller. As we will see in Section V, CHOOSE's refinement (i.e., its instantiation) has an important impact on security. It can, and in some cases should, take into account the labels on the kernel process on whose behalf it operates.
The first set of calls involve allocating new tags, such as:
That is, the subprocess NEWTAG+ picks a channel i such that i.g has input available. Then, it chooses an unallocated tag t via CHOOSE and returns that tag to the calling kernel process. It services the next request in a different state, reflecting that a new capability is available to all processes (t + ) and the tag t is now allocated. We next define NEWTAG-and NEWTAG0 similarly:
The DUALPRIVS subprocess gives a user process Ui access to the shared capabilities inÔ. On input Oi, it returnsDi, the set of tags for which process i has dual privilege. DUALPRIVS is formulated as below to prevent user processes from enumerating the contents ofÔ. Since there are no tags t such that {t − , t + } ⊆Ô, the process must privately own at least one privilege for t to get dual privilege for it. Thus, DUALPRIVS does not alert a process to the existence of any tags it did not already know of:
Finally, the behavior of CHECK+ has already been hinted at. Recall this subprocess checks to see if the supplied set of tags is globally addable:
And similarly:
2) The Process Manager (PROCMGR):
The main job of the process manager is to allocate process identifiers when kernel processes call fork. We assume a large space of process identifiers, P. The process manager keeps track of subsetP ⊆ P to account for which of those processes identifiers have already been used. In then allocates from P −P .
PROCMGRP = PM-FORKP | PM-GETPIDP | PM-EXITP
To answer the fork operation, the process manager picks an unused process ID (j) for the child, gives birth to the child (j:K) with the message j.b!(S, I, O), and returns child's process ID to the parent:
Trivially:
Kernel processes notify the process manager of their exits, which are handled as no-ops:
A final task for the process manager is to initialize the system, launching the first kernel process. This process runs with special process ID init, off-limits to other processes. Thus:
See Appendix B for a description of the QUEUES process, which is mostly an implementation detail.
G. High Level System Definition
The overall system SYS is an interleaving of all the processes specified. Recall that P is the set of all possible process IDs. The user-half of the system is:
The kernel processes are:
Adding in the helper process gives the complete kernel:
Finally:
KERNEL
This assembly of kernel process makes extensive use of the CSP hiding operator ("\"). That is, the combined process SYS does not show direct evidence of internal state transitions such as: communications between any i:K and the switch; communications with the tag manager; communications with the process manager; etc. In fact the only events that remain visible are the workings of the user processes Ui and their system calls given by i.s ? κ and i.s ! κ . By implication, kernels that implement the Flume model should hide the system's inner workings from unprivileged users (which is indeed the case for the Flume implementation). In practical terms, the CSP model for SYS shows what a non-root Unix user might see if examining his processes with the strace utility.
V. NONINTERFERENCE
A mature definition in the literature for models like Flume's is noninterference. Informally [17] :
One group of users, using a certain set of commands, is noninterfering with another group of users if what the first group does with those commands has no effect on what the second group of users can see.
In terms of Flume, select any export-protection tag t, a process p with t ∈ Sp, and a process q with t / ∈ Sq. Noninterference means that p's execution path should be entirely independent of q's. If p could somehow influence q, then it could reveal to q information tagged with t, violating the export-protection policy.
A. Definition
We use Ryan and Schneider's definition of noninterference [18] , where process equivalence follows the stable failures model [19] , [20] . This definition considers all possible pairs of traces for S that vary only by elements in the high alphabet (i.e., they are equal when projected to low). For each pair of traces, two experiments are considered: advancing S over the elements in left trace, and advancing S over the elements in the right trace. The two resulting processes must look equivalent from a "low" perspective. Formally: We say that the process S exhibits noninterference with respect to the low alphabet LO iff NILO (S) is true.
That is, after being advanced by tr and tr , the two processes must accept all of the same traces (projected to low) and refuse all of the same refusal sets (projected to low).
Given an arbitrary export-protection tag t (one such that t + ∈Ô and t − / ∈Ô), we define the high and low alphabets as follows. The high symbols emanate from a process with t ∈ Si:
The low symbols are the complement set:
1) Stability and Divergence:
There are several complications. The first is the issue of whether or not the stable failures model is adequate. For instance, if a high process caused the kernel to diverge (i.e., hang), a low process could record such an occurrence on reboot, thereby leaking a bit (very slowly!) to low. By construction, the Flume kernel never diverges. One can check this property by examining each system call and verifying that only a finite number of internal events can occur before the process is ready to receive the next call. Userspace process (e.g., Ui) can diverge, but they cannot observe each other's divergence, and so their divergence is inconsequential in our security analysis.
If divergence attacks were a practical concern, we could capture divergent behavior with the more general Failures, Divergences, Infinite Traces (FDI) model [20] . We conjecture that Flume's noninterference results under the stable failures model also hold in the FDI model, but the proof mechanics are yet more complicated.
2) Declassification: The second complication is declassification, also known as intransitive noninterference. That is, the system should allow certain flows of information from "high" processes to "low" processes, if that flow traverses the appropriate declassifier. Figure 5 provides a pictorial representation: the system allows low processes and the declassifier to influence all other processes, and the high processes to influence other high processes and declassifiers but not to influence low processes. However, in the transitive closure, all processes can influence all other processes, which negates any desired security properties.
Previous work by Roscoe et al. assumes a global security policy, and modifies existing noninterference definitions to rule out flows not in that policy [21] . The most relevant definition is that of Bossi et al., which partitions the space of symbols into three setshigh, low, and declassify -and adjusts definitions in the CCS/SPA process algebra accordingly [22] . These extensions are not directly applicable in our setting, since Flume processes can dynamically transition between high, low and declassify states by creating new tags, receiving capabilities, changing labels, and dropping capabilities (all of the six transitions are possible).
To accommodate Flume's model we present a new definition, whose key distinction is to consider declassification orthogonally to secrecy. That is, at any given time, each process can be either high or low (determined by whether t ∈ S) and either declassify or nondeclassify (determined by whether t − ∈ O). We define a new set of symbols MIDt that emanate from or are received by declassifier processes. MIDt has the property that MIDt and HIt need not be disjoint, nor do MIDt and LOt:
Next, consider all pairs of traces that differ only in high nondeclassify elements, and are therefore equivalent when projected to LOt ∪ MIDt. Again, two experiments are performed, advancing S over the left and right traces. The two resulting processes must look equivalent from a low, non-declassify perspective. The final definition captures the notion that high, non-declassifying processes cannot interfere with low, non-declassifying processes. If a high process wishes to influence a low process, it must communicate through a declassifier process.
Definition 4 (Noninterference with declassification). For a CSP process S, alphabets LO and MID contained in αS, the predicate NID
MID LO (S) is true iff ∀tr,tr ∈ traces(S) : tr (LO ∪ MID) = tr (LO ∪ MID) ⇒ SF S/tr (LO − MID) = SF S/tr (LO − MID) .
Note that this extended definition is equivalent to the standard definition if MID = {}, i.e., if declassification is disallowed. We conjecture an "unwound" version of this definition is equivalent to Bossi et al.'s DP BNDC if HIt and MIDt are disjoint, but we defer the proof to future work.
B. Allocation of Global Identifiers
The model presented in Section IV is almost fully-specified, with an important exception: the process CHOOSE:
The "internal (nondeterministic) choice" operator ( ) implies that the model requires further refinement. The question becomes: how to allocate tags and process identifiers?
An idea that does not work is sequential allocation, yielding the tag (or process ID) sequence 1, 2, 3, . . . . To attack this scheme, a low process forks, retrieving a child ID i. To communicate the value "k", the high process forks k times. The next time the low process forks, it gets process ID i + k, and by subtracting i recovers the high message. There are two problems: (1) low and high processes share the same process ID space; and (2) they can manipulate it in a predictable way.
The second weakness is exploitable even without the first. In a different attack, a high process communicates a "1" by allocating a tag via create tag(Add), and communicates a "0" by refraining from allocating. If a low process could guess which tag was allocated (call it t), it could then attempt to change its label to S = {t}. If the change succeeds, then the low process had access to t + throughÔ, meaning the high process allocated the tag. If the change fails, the high process must not have allocated. The weakness here is that the low process "guessed" the tag t without the high process needing to communicate it. If such guesses were impossible (or very unlikely), the attack would fail.
Another idea-common to all DIFC kernels (c.f., Asbestos [1] , HiStar [2] and the Flume implementation)-is random allocation from a large pool. The random allocation scheme addresses the second weakness-predictability-but not the first. That is, operations like process forking and tag creation always have globally observable side affects: a previously unallocated resource becomes claimed. Consider, as an example, this trace for the Flume system: was also a valid trace for the system. But after tr occurs, tr is no longer possible, since the process j can only be born once. In other words, tr tr is not a valid trace for the system but tr is by itself. This contradicts the definition of noninterference in the stable failures model of process equivalence. To summarize, we have argued that allocation of elements from O andP , must obey two properties: (1) unpredictability and (2) partitioning. Our approach is to design a randomized allocation scheme that achieves both. Define parameters: α log 2 (the number of tags) β log 2 (maximum number of operations)
− log 2 (acceptable failure probability)
A reasonable value for β is 80, meaning that no instance of the Flume system will attempt more that 2 80 operations. Since tag allocation, forking and constructing labels count as operations, the system expresses fewer than 2 β tags, process IDs, or labels in its lifetime. A reasonable value for is 100, meaning the system fails catastrophically at any moment with probability at most 2 −100 .
Define a lookup table s(·), that given any label or capability set outputs a integer in [0, 2 β ) that uniquely identifies it. This serialization can be predictable. Next consider the family of all injective functions:
The Flume system, upon startup, picks an element g ∈ G at random. When called upon by a process with labels S, I, O to allocate a new tag or process ID, it returns g(s(S), s(I), s(O), x), for some heretofore unused x ∈ {0, 1} β . The output is a tag in {0, 1} α . Appendix C derives α ≥ max( + 1, 4β), meaning α = 320 for our example parameters.
Thus, we let T = P = {0, 1} α , for a sufficiently large α. The kernel picks g ∈ G at random upon startup. Then CHOOSE is refined as:
Note that G(S, I, O, Y ) ⊆ Y , so the nature of the refinement is just to restrict the set of IDs that CHOOSEY will ever output, based on the capabilities, secrecy and integrity labels of the calling process.
C. Theorem and Proof
The main theorem is as follows:
Theorem 1 (Noninterference in Flume). For any security parameter
, there exists an instantiation of CHOOSE such that: for any exportprotection tag t, for any Flume instance SYS,
In other words, the system administrator of a Flume system first decides on a security parameter , expecting calamitous system collapse with probability of at most 1−2 − . He instantiates CHOOSE with , then boots the system. The init process runs, spawning an assortment of user processes, which combine with the kernel processes to constitute a new overall system SYS. For any export protection tag t that is allocated as the system runs, the extended noninterference property holds with the desired probability. This guarantee holds over all instances of SYS, regardless of what user processes (i.e., UPROCS) malicious users might cook up. The proof is by induction over the number of low symbols in the two traces, tr and tr . (Recall that tr and tr are equivalent when projected to the low/mid alphabets). For the base case, tr and tr have no low symbols, and therefore have no high symbols, since the system accepts only low symbols in its initial state. Since tr = tr = {}, the theorem follows trivially.
We prove the inductive step casewise, considering each system call and whether the kernel is looking to accept a new system call or reply to an outstanding call. Most cases reason about the causal relationships among events in the trace. A more involved case is change label, which must consider the unlikely case that a low process guessed which tags a high process received from the kernel when calling create tag. See Appendix D for details.
VI. DISCUSSION
To review, we have described the Flume kernel both informally and with CSP formalism and proven that the CSP model upholds a definition of noninterference. In this section, we discuss the implications of these results, and how they can be translated to a practical system.
A. Refinement
Due to the well-known refinement paradox, the Flume model might satisfy noninterference, but implementations (i.e. refinements 5 ) of it might not [23] . To circumvent this paradox, Lowe has recently strengthened notions of noninterference, requiring that a system like SYS and all of its refinements exhibit noninterference [24] . Other work has suggested restricting refinement to a set of operators known to preserve security guarantees [25] . We follow Lowe's approach as best as possible, arguing that noninterference holds for most refinements.
The parts of the Flume model that need refinement are those that display non-determinism via the or operators: (1) the CHOOSE process; (2) the user processes Ui; (3) "scheduling"; and (4) the tock events in timed CSP. As for (1), the proof in Section D holds for some refinements of CHOOSE, such as the random function specified in Section V-B and a more practical hash-based approach considered below. A Flume implementation should refine CHOOSE as specified, or with a method known to preserve noninterference. As for (2), the proof in Section D holds for arbitrary refinements of user processes Uis, as long as they communicate only through the designated system calls (see Section IV-A). In practice, we cannot hope to isolate the Uis completely from one another: they can communicate by manipulating shared hardware resources (e.g., disks, CPU cache, CPU cycles, network bandwidth, etc.)
As for (3), the Flume model hides scheduling for simplicity: any interleaving of processes is admissible, by Equation 1 in Section IV-G. However, a practical refinement of Flume would implement "fairness" restrictions on scheduling, disallowing one process from consuming more than its "fair" share of resources. Scheduling refinements, in and of themselves, do not affect the proof of security: noninterference holds in any reordering of high and low processes, as long as all processes get to run eventually, and do not have any comprehension of time. As for (4), Appendix E explores extending the Flume model to show an explicit passage of time: the event tock denotes one clock tick, and all parts of the model must stand aside and yield to tock. We conjecture that if tock ∈ HIt, then the proof holds for all refinements of the scheduler, and that if tock ∈ LOt, that the proof holds for only some refinements. Further exploration is deferred to future work.
In sum, we believe the Flume model to maintain noninterference under important refinements-tag allocation, arbitrary user processes, and scheduling-if timing channels are excluded (i.e., if tock ∈ HIt). Of course, this is a far cry from proving noninterference in a working implementation, but a significant improvement over the status quo. Systems such as Asbestos and IX have gaping covert channels baked into their very specifications, so any refinements of those systems are insecure. By contrast, an OS developer has a fighting chance to realize a secure Flume implementation.
B. Kernel Organization
The Flume DIFC model is a "monolithic" kernel design, in which the kernel is a hidden black box, and user-level processes have a well-specified system call interface. Some modern approaches to kernel design (e.g. the Exokernel [26] and the Infokernel [27] ) expose more of the kernel's inner workings to give application developers more flexibility. However, such transparency in an information-flow control setting can leak information: imagine a high process issuing create tag, and a low process observing TAGMGR's transitions. The simplest way to work around this problem is to conceal the inner workings of the kernel (as we have done). Another, more complicated solution, is to model more parallelism inside the kernel, so that the tag manager can serve both high and low concurrently.
The Flume model captures most of the kernel processes-like the i:K, the tag manager, and the process manager-as single-threaded processes. For instance, if the tag manager is responding to a request for i.g.(create tag, w), it cannot service j.g.(create tag, w) until it replies to i.g.(create tag, w). In practical implementations of this CSP model, such serialization might be a bottleneck for performance. More parallelism internal to the kernel is possible, but would require explicit synchronization through locks, and more complexity overall.
C. Tag Allocations
The use of a truly random function for CHOOSE is impractical, as are tag sizes of 320 bits. In practice, a weaker cryptographic primitive suffices, such as a Message Authentication Code (MAC) [28] with a collision-resistant hash function [29] . Let M be such a MAC of suitable input length. The kernel picks a random secret key k on startup, and then computes new tags and process IDs using M k (S, I, O, x) for a counter variable x. This construction approximates both important properties. The unforgability property of the MAC implies that an adversary cannot find (S, I, O, x) = (S , I , O , x ) such that HMAC k (S, I, O, x) = HMAC k (S , I , O , x ), so a high process with secrecy {t} and a low process with secrecy {} will not get the same tag. Similarly, user processes cannot predict the output of HMAC k (S, I, O, x) without knowing k.
D. Integrity
Though we have focused on secrecy, the same arguments hold for integrity. Analogously, one would pick an integrity-protection tag t, one for which t − ∈Ô and t + / ∈Ô. The low symbols are those whose integrity tags contain t, and the high symbols are those that do not. The same proof shows that the high events do not interfere with the low.
VII. RELATED WORK
Information flow control (IFC) at the operating system level dates back to the centralized military systems of the 70s, and 80s [30] , [15] , [31] . Several systems like IX [11] and SELinux [32] integrated information-flow ideas with Unix-like operating systems in 90s. Denning first pointed out that dynamically-adjusted security labels could leak data [12] and suggested instead static checking, which later found fruition as type-analysis [33] . Decentralized declassification and endorsement proved a key relaxation, making IFC practical for language-based systems [4] , and eventual spurring a revitalization of the idea in operating systems and web-serving settings with the Asbestos [1] , HiStar [2] and Flume [3] systems. HiStar introduced the idea of "self-tainting," solving the wide covert channel described in Section III. Flume later adopted a similar strategy, but within a streamlined label system. Taint-tracking is another technique for tracking information flow through legacy software written in arbitrary languages [34] , [35] . Such systems run a target application as rewritten binary, without the cooperation or recognition of the application in question, meaning they must infer label changes. Therefore taint-tracking systems are susceptible to the covert channel attacks described in Section III, and cannot uphold noninterference.
Goguen and Meseguer introduced the idea of noninterference for security protocols [17] , while Volpano et al. first showed that type systems could provably uphold the idea [36] . More recently, Zheng and Myers [37] and also Tse and Zdancewic [38] proved that statically-typed systems with runtime principles could still obey noninterference. Relative to Flume, information flow is monitored at a finer granularity. On the other hand, the Flume model provides more flexibility as to how the various user processes Ui behave: it restricts these processes from accessing all but one communication channel, but otherwise they can act arbitrarily and need not be type-checked.
The proofs offered here are manual. In future work, we hope to investigate shaping the Flume model used in the proof to a form that is amenable to automated analysis. Lowe first used an automated checker to break protocol previous assumed secure [39] . Ryan and Schneider also describe how the FDR automated checker can verify standard security protocols [40] , VIII. CONCLUSION This paper presented the first formal security argument for a DIFCbased operating system. It modelled Flume using the CSP formalism, and proved that the model fulfills noninterference-an end-to-end property that protects secrecy and integrity even against subtle covert channel attacks. The model and proof are not substantially weakened by the refinement paradox, since the proof holds for many refinements of the model. Future work calls for further investigation of timing-based covert and side channels, and automation of the proof techniques, for both the model and its implementation. 
A. Review of CSP
Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) is a process algebra useful in specifying systems as a set of parallel state machines that sometimes synchronize on events. We offer a brief review of it here, borrowing heavily from Hoare's book [16] .
1) CSP Processes: Among the most basic CSP examples is Hoare's vending machine:
This vending machine waits for the event in25, which corresponds to the input of a quarter into the machine. Next, it accepts the event choc, which corresponds to a chocolate falling out of the machine. Then it returns to the original state, with a recursive call to itself. The basic operator at use here is the prefix operator. If x is an event, and P is a process, then (x → P ), pronounced "x then P ," represents a process that engages in event x and then behaves like process P . For a process P , the notation αP describes the "alphabet" of P . It is a set of all of the events that P is ever willing to engage in. For example, αVMS = {in25, choc}.
For any CSP process P , we can discuss a trace of events that P may accept. For the VMS example, various traces include:
For two traces tr and tr , define tr tr to be their concatenation.
The next important operator is "choice," denoted by "|". If x and y are distinct events, then:
denotes a process that accepts x and then behaves like P or accepts y and then behaves like Q. For example, a new vending machine can accept either a coin and output a chocolate, or accept a bill and output an ice cream cone:
CSP offers a more general choice function (for choosing between many inputs succinctly), but the Flume model only requires simple choice.
A related operator is internal (nondeterministic) choice, is denoted " ". In simple choice, the machine reacts exactly to events it fields from the machine's user. In nondeterministic choice, the machine behaves unpredictably from the perspective of the user, maybe because the machine's description is underspecified, or maybe because the machine is picking from a random number generator. For instance, a change machine might return coins in any order, depending on how the machine was last serviced:
That is, the machine takes as input a quarter, and returns two dimes and a nickel in one of two orderings. Another standard operator, "external choice" denoted " ", has different semantics but does not appear in Flume's model. CSP provides useful predefined processes like STOP, the process that accepts no events, and SKIP, the process that shows a successful termination and then behaves like STOP. Other processes like DIV, RUN and CHAOS are standard in the literature, but are not required here.
The next class of operators relate to parallelism. The notation:
denotes P running in parallel with Q, synchronizing on events in A.
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This means a stream of incoming events can be arbitrarily assigned to either P or Q, assuming those events are not in A. However, for events in A, both P and Q must accept them in synchrony. As an example, consider the vending machine and the change machine running in parallel, synchronizing on the event in25: Another variation on parallel composition is arbitrary interleaving, denoted: P Q. In interleaving, P and Q never synchronize, operating independently of one another. P Q is therefore equivalent to P {} Q, which means P and Q run in parallel and synchronize on the empty set.
Processes that run in parallel can communicate with one another over channels. A typical channel c can carry various values v, denoted c.v.
7 This is represented as the sending process accepting the event c!v while the receiving process accepts the event c?x (where x is thus far unbound) and sets x to v. Communication on a channel is possible only when the sender and receiver processes are in the respective states simultaneously. If one process is at the suitable state and the other is not, the ready process waits until its partner becomes ready. In a slight deviation from Hoare's semantics, channels here are bidirectional: messages can travel independently in either direction across a channel. The Flume model uses channels extensively.
The next important CSP feature is concealment or hiding. For a process P and a set of symbols C, the process P \C is P with symbols in C hidden or concealed. The events in C become internal transitions, that cannot be observed by other processes through synchronization or channel communication. Concealment can induce divergence-an infinite sequence of internal transitions. For instance, the process P = (c → P )\{c} diverges immediately, never to be useful again. The use of concealment in the Flume model is careful never to induce divergence in this manner.
Concealment enables subroutines (or subordination, in Hoare's terminology). For two process P and Q whose alphabets fulfill αP ⊆ αQ, the new process P Q is defined as (P Q)\αP . This means that the subroutine P is available within Q, but not visible to the outside world. The notation p:P Q means a particular instance p of the subroutine P is available in Q. Then an event such as p!x?y within Q means that Q is calling subroutine p with argument x, and that the return value is placed into y. Within P , the event ?x means receive the argument x from the caller, and the event !y means return the result y to the caller.
A final important language feature is renaming. Given a "template" process P , the notation i:P means a "renaming" of P with all events prefixed by i. That is, if the event c!v appears in P , then the event i.c!v appears in i:P , where i.c is the channel c that has been renamed to i.c. Thus, for any i = j, the alphabets of i:P and j:P are disjoint: α(i:P ) ∩ α(j:P ) = {}. This concludes our whirlwind tour of CSP features. We refer the reader to Hoare's [16] , Schneider's [20] and Roscoe's [19] books for many more details.
2) The Stable Failures Model: We now expand upon the idea of traces to develop an idea of process equivalence in CSP. The traces of P (denoted traces(P )) is the set of all traces accepted by the process P . The refusals of P (denoted refusals(P )) is a set of sets. A set X is in refusals(P ) if and only if P deadlocks when offered any event from X. For instance, consider the process P0:
We write that refusals(P0) = {{a}, {b}}. That is, P0 can nondeterministically choose the left branch, in which case it will only accept {a} and will refuse {b}. On the other hand, if it nondeterministically chooses the left branch, it will accept {b} and refuse {a}. Thus, due to nondeterminism, we write refusals(P ) as above, and not as the flattened union {a, b}.
The notation Q ↓ is a predicate that denotes the process Q is "stable." Unstable states are those that transition internally, or those that diverge. For example, the process P0 begins at an unstable state, since it can make progress in either the left or right direction without accepting any input. However, once it makes its first internal transition, arriving at either a → STOP or b → STOP, it becomes stable. A process that diverges, such as (c → P )\{c}, has no stable states.
Though the CSP literature explores many notions of process equivalence, this paper uses the "stable failures" model, given in Hoare's book [16] and rephrased by Schneider [20] and Roscoe [19] . For a process P , the stable failures of P , written SF P , are defined as:
In other words, the failures of P captures which traces P accepts, and which sets it refuses after accepting those traces. For example:
In the stable failures model, two processes P and Q are deemed equivalent if and only if SF P = SF Q .
Lastly, CSP offers a way to identify processes in states other than their initial states: the process P/tr is P advanced to the state after the trace tr has occurred. Next, we often talk about the effects of "purging" certain events from traces and process states. The operator " " denotes projection. The trace tr A is the trace tr projected onto the set A, meaning all events not in A are removed. For instance, if A = {a}, and tr = a, b, c, d, a, b, c , then tr A = b, c, d, b , c . For a set C, the set C A is simply the intersection of the two. Define two projected processes P A and Q A equivalent if and only if SF P A = SF Q A, where:
and similarly for Q.
B. Per-process Queues (QUEUES)
Each kernel process i:K needs it own set of queues, to handle messages received asynchronously from other processes. For convenience, we package up all of the queues in a single process i:QUEUES, which i:K can access in all of its various states. The channel q serves communication between the queues and the kernel process. The building block of this process is a single QUEUE process, similar to that defined in Hoare's book. This process is parameterized by the value stored in the queue, and of course the queue starts out empty:
From here, we define state transitions:
Note that these queues are bounded beneath NQ elements. Attempts to enqueue messages on filled queues result in dropped messages. The model combines many QUEUE subprocesses into a collection processes called QUEUESET:
The process called QUEUES communicates with kernel processes. Recall that i.q is the channel shared between i:K and i:QUEUES:
Finally, the point of QSELECT is to determine which of the supplied queues have pending messages. This process uses tail recursion to recv in which i receives the capability t − from another process. After either system call return, i:KS,I,O transitions to some new state i:K S,I,O∪{t − } . From this point forward, the failures of i:K lie outside of LOt − MIDt, and need not be considered by our extended definition of noninterference.
• l = i.s.(S, I, O, create tag, w) for some i ∈ P, and some w ∈ {Add, Remove, None} After accepting this event, the process i:K can no longer accept system calls; it can only accept a response in the form i.s.(S, I, O, t ) for some tag t . Since l ∈ LOt, it follows that t / ∈ S for both the system call and its eventual reply. The high events in h could affect the return value to this system call (and therefore SF S/tr ) if the space of t's returned somehow depends on h, because h changed the state of the shared tag manager. An inspection of the tag manager shows that its state only changes as a result of a call to e = j.g.(S , I , O , create tag, w) for some process j, and labels S , I and O . Such a call would result in a tag such as t = g(S , I , O , x) being allocated, for some arbitrary x. Because e ∈ h is a high event, t ∈ S . Because l is a low event, t / ∈ S. Thus, S = S, and assuming g is injective, it follows that t = t, for all x. Therefore, events in h cannot influence which tags t might be allocated as a result of a call to create tag. We apply the same argument as above, that h and l can happen either before or after one another without changing the failures of the system.
• l = i.s.(S, I, O, change label, w, L) for some i ∈ P, w ∈ {Add, Remove, None} and L ⊆ T . Consider all traces of the form tr = p l h, where l is as above. As usual, we consider all elements of h that might affect process i:K after it has accepted event l. After l, the process i:K can only accept an event of the form i.s.(S, I, O, r) for r ∈ {Ok, Error}, to indicate whether the label change succeeded or failed. The only way an event in h can influence the outcome r is to alter the composition ofÔ, which the tag manager checks on i's behalf by answering i.g.(check+) and i.g.(check-) within the CHECK subprocess. That is, some high process j must request a new tag with system call e = j.s.(S , I , O , create tag, w), where t ∈ S , and e ∈ h. Moreover, the kernel must return as a result some new tag t such that t ∈ L, where L is the label that low process i desires to change to. If both of these conditions hold, then the tag manager might have switched to a new state in which t + ∈Ô or t − ∈Ô, meaning the kernel's response to event l could have changed based on h. Such an h is extremely unlikely. Since l happened before h in trace tr, t can only be a member of L if Ui "predicted" the output of the tag manager, which it can do with negligible probability (2 − ). With high probability, h does not contain any elements that can affect r or future states of i:K after event l. Thus, Lt p l h = Lt p l , which proves the case. The only event i:K will accept after l is i.s.(S, I, O, k) where k is the process ID of the newly-forked child. By definition of CHOOSE above, there exists some x such that k = g(s(S), s(I), s(O), x). If an event e ∈ h causes a process ID to be chosen, it would be of the form p = g(s(S ), s(I ), s(O ), y), for some y, and some S such that t ∈ S . That l is a low symbol implies that t / ∈ S and S = S . If g is injective then k = p. Therefore, event e will never change the value k that this kernel process might output next as its reply to the system call l. The other result of the fork system call is that now, a new process k is running. That is, k : K has moved out of the "birth state" and is now willing to accept incoming system calls in state (k : KS,I,O). The same arguments as above apply here. Because k was forked by a low process, it too is a low process, expecting only low symbols before it transitions to a new state. Therefore, the events in h cannot affect its state machine.
• l = i.s.(S, I, send, j, X, m) for some j, X, m.
The outcome of the send operation depends only on whether X ⊆ O or not. It therefore does not depend on h.
• l = i.s.(S, I, O, recv, j)
The event after l that i:K accepts is i.s.(S, I, O, m) for some message m. It might also change to a different state if the process j sent capabilities. The relevant possibility for e ∈ h to consider is e = j.s.(S , I , O , send, i, {t + }, ), for some high process j with t ∈ S . The claim is that this message will never be enqueued at i and therefore will not affect i's next visible event. Say that process j has ownership O and dual privileges D . That t is an export-protection tags implies t − / ∈Ô; that all events in h are not in MIDt implies t − / ∈ O ; that l / ∈ MIDt implies t − / ∈ O. Thus, t / ∈ D ∪D . Also, because i is a low process t / ∈ S. Therefore, t ∈ S − D and t / ∈ S ∪ D, which implies that S − D ⊆ S ∪ D, and the kernel will not enqueue or deliver j's message to i. Again, we have that h does not affect i's possibilities for the next message it receives. The remaining events (e.g., drop caps, exit, etc.) follow similarly and are elided for brevity. c) Inductive
Step, l ∈ MIDt: The previous section considered all traces of the form tr = p l h where l / ∈ MIDt; it remains to cover the case of l ∈ MIDt. When l consists of any system call aside from send or drop caps, we claim that Lt SYS/p l = Lt SYS/p . That is, on either side of such an event, all processes in a MIDt state stay in that state, and don't communicate with any low processes. If such processes allocate new tags or process IDs (via fork), CHOOSE's partitioning of the identifier space prevents declassifiers from taking tag or process IDs from low processes.
If l is an event of the form i.s.(S, I, O, send, j, X, m) where j corresponds to a "low" process, then l can affect the failures of a low process. However, we can apply the same argument as above to conclude that the elements of h do not interfere with j's receipt of i's message, or its subsequent states. If t − ∈ X, then process j becomes a declassifier upon receipt of i's message, its traces no longer in the set LOt − MIDt. High events (like those in h) can then influence i, but the definition no longer considers j's failures.
If l is an event of the form i.s.(S, I, O, drop caps, X), and t − ∈ X, then l represents process i's rescinding its status as a declassifier; it becomes a low process like any other. No high event can interfere with the drop caps operation, since its success depends only on O and X. Once the capability is dropped, i can be analyzed under the first set of cases (pertaining to events in LOt but not in MIDt).
